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Indonesian policy on non-residents’ 
participation in the money market: the restriction 
of rupiah transactions by non-residents and foreign 




The financial crisis which began in the second half of 1997 devastated Indonesia’s banking sector and 
resulted in a prolonged economic downturn that continues to affect the economy today. The source of 
the crisis can be traced to the acceleration of Indonesia’s economic integration into the global financial 
market, without the corresponding development of the required institutions to ensure the smooth 
running of the financial and corporate sectors. Among other liberalisations, the Government allowed 
the rupiah to be freely convertible for capital account transactions as well as current account 
transactions and at the same time permitted the internationalisation of the currency.
2 Indonesia 
allowed the development of an active offshore market in the rupiah. The rupiah became a commodity 
tradable in the international market. The international use of the rupiah for export and import 
payments, however, was not significant. Export and import invoices were mostly denominated in major 
world currencies, including the US dollar and Japanese yen. Therefore, the internationalisation of the 
rupiah was confined mostly to the financial market. These actions encouraged both the banking and 
corporate sectors to borrow freely from external sources.  
This liberalisation process, however, was not supported by efforts to strengthen public and corporate 
governance. Furthermore, the weakness in the availability and quality of data and information also 
compromised the quality of decision-making by the business sector and the government. Finally, the 
exchange rate regime at the time, which attempted to manage the fluctuation of the rupiah within a 
narrow band, was inconsistent with monetary policy to control inflation. 
As an initial response taken in consultation with the IMF, Indonesia replaced the intervention band with 
a free floating exchange rate in August 1997. Under the new regime, market forces freely determined 
the rupiah exchange rate while the authorities influenced the market indirectly through fiscal and 
monetary policy. By switching to this new regime, the central bank hoped to dampen the speculative 
attacks on the rupiah as well as to obtain a stronger hold on domestic monetary developments. The 
opposite occurred as the rupiah’s decline rapidly accelerated, as shown in Graph 1.  
Although the crisis originated in an over-leveraged corporate sector and a banking sector that had 
mismatched assets and liabilities, the liquidity crunch that Asian borrowers faced after July 1997 
quickly spun out of control, as heightened political and social tensions overwhelmed economic 
fundamentals. Our experience suggests that in a liberal financial system, financial markets can be 
subject to self-fulfilling panics, especially in the presence of highly leveraged positions. In a segmented 
and thinly traded foreign exchange market, exchange rate movements are extremely reactive to any 
change in sentiment - especially negative changes - and are subject to manipulation and herd 
behaviour. Although the rupiah was probably overvalued in mid-1997, the subsequent excessive 
overshooting and extreme volatility cannot be explained by the domestic macroeconomic situation. 
                                                       
1  Hartadi A Sarwono, Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia. E-mail: hartadi@bi.go.id. 
2  Internationalisation of the rupiah in general can be defined as the use of the rupiah in international transactions, including 
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Graph 1 
Managed floating to free 
floating exchange rate 
 
At the time of the crisis, investors’ sentiment turned negative as reflected in the risk premium - the 
spread of the Indonesian Yankee bond over the comparable US Treasury note. The 
internationalisation of the rupiah provided an opportunity for non-residents to take advantage of this 
loss of confidence and to speculate in the offshore rupiah market. Speculative activity in the rupiah 
intensified amid the lack of social and political stability in Indonesia. This caused excessive exchange 
rate volatility and made it difficult for monetary policy to maintain the stability of the rupiah, which had a 
negative impact on the overall macroeconomic situation. The weakening rupiah harmed 
macroeconomic stability through the pass-through impact on inflation, which led to higher interest 
rates than optimal to support economic and financial stability. Depreciation also affected the fiscal 
deficit, by raising the cost of external debt service as the rupiah value of the debt stock exploded.  
Graph 2 











Weakness in the currency persisted well after the initial panic subsided. During the first three years of 
the floating exchange rate system, the volatility of the rupiah remained high compared to other Asian 
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Table 1 
Exchange rate volatility: 1995-2000 
  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 
A. Daily  volatility
1                   
Indonesia   0.15    0.15    2.49   4.86   1.88   1.05 
Korea   0.25    0.23    2.65   1.75   0.48   0.42 
Philippines   0.28    0.05   1.31   1.19   0.45   0.58 
Thailand   0.12    0.08    1.71   1.58   0.56   0.45 
Malaysia   0.23    0.15    0.90   1.75   0.01   0.01 
B. Monthly  volatility
2                   
Indonesia   0.51    0.65    11.25   32.66   10.25   3.85 
Korea   1.06    0.93    10.06   7.49   2.86   2.44 
Philippines   1.50    0.09   5.09   4.85   1.83   3.44 
Thailand   0.59    0.34    8.45   8.93   3.08   2.18 
Malaysia   1.06    0.61    4.48   7.21   0.01   0.01 
1  Standard deviation from percentage changes of daily exchange rate.   
2  Standard deviation from percentage changes of 
monthly exchange rate. 
Source: IMF Working Paper 01/152. 
 
The negative impact of internationalisation of the domestic currency 
The internationalisation of the rupiah allowed non-residents to play a large role in deciding the 
direction of the exchange rate as their activity was followed by traders in the local market. It is difficult 
to know the exact amount of offshore rupiah because this is beyond Bank Indonesia’s jurisdiction. 
However, rupiah transactions by non-residents, and their role in affecting of the direction of the 
exchange rate, could be traced through their vostro accounts with onshore banks. Activity in these 
accounts tended to be high and volume increased during periods when the exchange rate was under 
heavy pressure as shown in Graph 3. Rupiah speculation by non-residents was made possible 
because of the relatively easy access to rupiah from onshore banks. In addition, ample liquidity in the 
domestic financial market was available since loan demand had dried up. With investment 
opportunities still limited, investing in the foreign exchange market was one attractive alternative for 
banks with excess liquidity.  
The disparity between the volatility of the rupiah and the currencies of Asian countries that had taken 
measures to limit the internationalisation of their currencies led Bank Indonesia to evaluate existing 
regulations governing rupiah transactions with non-residents. Bank Indonesia determined that the 
offshore market for rupiah had induced greater volatility in capital flows and exchange rate 
movements. At times it had also complicated the efforts of Bank Indonesia to control the money 
supply.  174  BIS Papers No 23
 
Graph 3 
Fluctuation in vostro account 
vs IDR/USD exchange rate 
 
Bank Indonesia regulation 
Because of these problems, it was deemed necessary to have a policy that would minimise the 
opportunity for non-residents to speculate against the rupiah. Therefore, Bank Indonesia issued 
Regulation no 3/3/2001 on 12 January 2001, which limited rupiah transactions between onshore 
banks and non-residents.  
To this end, we designed policies to reduce the volatility of the rupiah exchange rate that originated 
from foreign exchange trading without underlying economic transactions, while maintaining our 
commitment to a free foreign exchange regime. The opportunity of non-residents to speculate on the 
rupiah would be curtailed through the limitation in accessing credits from the domestic banking 
system. Therefore, Bank Indonesia issued a regulation restricting rupiah transactions and foreign 
currency credit offered by banks to non-residents. The regulation consisted of two major parts, namely 
restrictions on certain transactions by banks with non-residents without any exception and limitations 
on derivative transactions with non-residents, with some exceptions. 
The coverage of the regulation is as follows: 
1.  Prohibits banks from extending loans and providing other sources of rupiah funding to 
non-residents including: 
•  Rupiah and foreign exchange loans to non-residents, including intraday overdrafts; 
•  Placement of rupiah in the form of deposits or other means in offshore banks; 
•  Investment in rupiah-denominated assets issued by non-residents; 
•  Inter-office transactions in rupiah (domestic branch lending to offshore branches); 
•  Equity participation in rupiah by non-residents. 
2.  Restricts banks from conducting derivative transactions without underlying transactions. 
Restricted derivative transactions encompass: 
•  Forward sales, including next day and spot currency transactions rolled over as 
synthetic transactions replicating foreign currency forward sales; 
•  Swap sales including overnight and next day swaps; 
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3.  Prohibits banks from transferring rupiah to non-residents without underlying economic 
activities in Indonesia.  
•  Transferring rupiah from residents to non-residents is prohibited, except: 
–  Settlement of forex buying against the rupiah; 
–  Settlement on NR accounts with onshore banks related to domestic economic 
activities such as equity participation, securities transactions, foreign debt 
repayment in rupiah, import L/Cs in rupiah, goods and services purchased in 
Indonesia, and NR living costs in Indonesia. 
•  Transferring rupiah from non-residents to non-residents is prohibited, except: 
–  Settlement of forex transactions; 
–  Settlement on NR accounts with onshore banks related to domestic economic 
activities such as equity participation, securities transactions, goods and 
services purchased in Indonesia, and NR living costs in Indonesia. 
Evaluation 
We recognised that these restrictions did not automatically contain exchange rate fluctuations. There 
are many factors, including non-economic factors, that affect the value of the rupiah. As in most 
segmented and thin markets, the rupiah exchange rate is largely event driven. The social and political 
turmoil experienced during 2001 contributed heavily to the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of 
Bank Indonesia’s regulations in reducing the rupiah exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless, the 
evidence of the exchange rate volatility during the first two months after the introduction of this 
regulation showed some encouraging results. The rupiah’s volatility fell from an average of 2.2% in 
2000 to 0.8% and 0.9% in January and February 2001, respectively, while the average balances of 
daily vostro accounts also fell substantially from Rp531.6 billion before the regulation to Rp88.6 billion 
after its issuance or less than 20% of its previous average balance. 
Reviews of the regulation’s effectiveness have been conducted regularly since its implementation. 
Hence, some areas will be subject to further improvement. One major objection to the regulation has 
been the impact in curbing access to the rupiah for hedging purposes, especially to cover unrealised 
investments. Under the existing regulation, investors who have already signed an agreement to invest 
but have not executed the transaction are banned from hedging facilities, as no underlying transaction 
has been executed. Therefore, one proposal for improvement includes the extension of the coverage 
of derivative transactions for hedging purposes under the above circumstances and a better definition 
on technical issues, such as the definition of credit, sanctions, as well as the clarification of several 
operational issues. 
Concluding remarks 
Limiting the availability of the rupiah to non-residents is not the only answer to achieve stability of the 
rupiah exchange rate. Many factors contribute to the fluctuation of the rupiah. The Indonesian foreign 
exchange market is volatile not only because of its structure but also due to political and 
macroeconomic developments. Nevertheless, with the current regulation, we have minimised the 
opportunities to undertake speculative activities by taking advantage of non-economic factors so that 
the rupiah exchange rate will more closely reflect economic fundamentals, thereby easing the task of 
Bank Indonesia, the central bank. 